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Clientelism and Economic Policy: Hybrid Characteristics of Collective Action in 
Greece 
 
How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of 
clients to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that clientelism goes 
beyond the exchange of votes and permeates organizations with the capacity for collective 
action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system that 
changes both patron-client relations and the context of collective action with important 
implications for the design of economic policy. As evidence from Greece shows, patrons 
in government are better off avoiding reforms that deprive their client groups of collective 
and personal benefits (clientelist bias in policy-making). Labour unions permeated by 
party clients have weak autonomy from the patron party but, operating inside the party 
network, they can effectively safeguard their access to club goods. Interdependent 
preferences and organizational linkages between the patron party and its client 
organizations favour collaboration over policy-making and co-optation instead of open 
confrontation.   
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Introduction  
 
The relationship between clientelism and policy-making needs further analysis and 
empirical substantiation. Recent research has observed a significant association between 
clientelism and fiscal consolidation under economic crisis (Afonso, Zartaloudis and 
Papadopoulos 2015) and between clientelism and structural reforms (Trantidis 2014), but 
the explanatory link between the two phenomena remains under-theorized. While party 
clients can use their vote to reward or punish their patrons (Pappas 2014: 44-51; Afonso, 
Zartaloudis and Papadopoulos 2015), politicians facing tough economic conditions may 
discard some client groups for policies that could secure the system's sustainability and, 
possibly, broader electoral popularity (Geddes 1994: 95). However, patron-client relations 
extend beyond the trade-off of votes. Clientelism can permeate labour unions and other 
professional groups and blend with typical structures of collective action, generating 
hybrid structures of interest intermediation. More attention must be paid to the properties 
of this system regarding party-union interdependencies, shared interests, the special 
position of the unions as client groups and the degree of government autonomy. These 
features shape the context of policy preference formation.  
 
This article clarifies how this clientelist-collective system differs from both typical 
clientelism and the conventional interest-group schema and how it shapes incentives, 
bargaining power, relative actors' autonomy and preferences, leading to a policy bias 
towards protecting the privileges of unionized client groups during a reform process. This 
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is shown in the interplay between PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Party) and its affiliated 
unions over a period of 20 years (1985-2004) in Greece. Greece is chosen as a 'pilot case' 
for theory development (Eckstein 2000) for two reasons. It has had a highly clientelist 
party systemi and offers a ‘tough test’ for the resilience of this system for the reason that 
deteriorating macroeconomic imbalances since 1985 exerted strong pressure on Greek 
governments to consider reform options that could harm the status of unionized party 
clients, such as privatization, the closure of ailing state-owned companies, lay-offs, and 
the restructuring of employment terms in the broader public sector.ii  
 
The article combines a macro-structural study of a clientelist system with analysis of this 
institutional setting. In this account, actors respond rationally to the incentives they face, 
and these incentives are inferred from the empirical context in which they are situated 
(Boettke et al 2005:290; Pierson 2000:72). This allows research to trace stable 
relationships connecting social and economic actors in a given setting and infer their 
recurrent effect on preferences. Analysis often neglects the context-specific nature of 
policy-related bargaining. When some of these features are seen as 'social capital' in a 
given location (Cf. Tsakalotos and Lyberaki 2002), they are, detached from a discussion 
of institutionally embedded incentives, which could better explain their reproduction and 
resilience. Historical observations can be clustered in patterns of behaviour and explained 
by an incentive-based analysis (Bates et al. 1998: 10-13). This analytic narrative, 
regardless of the degree of formalism, does not generate deterministic conclusions (Levi 
2002: 122-124), but helps build ‘contingent generalizations' (George and Bennett 2005:81, 
84) which research can further explore in other case-studies (Gerring 2004:349).  
 
 
Clientelism and the context of collective action and policy-making 
 
Clientelism - the allocation of benefits by political actors (patrons) to political supporters 
(clients) in return for their support (Piattoni 2001: 4; Stokes 2007: 605) - is seen as ‘a 
vertical, dyadic alliance between people of unequal status, power and resources’ (Landé 
1977: xx). The typical view is that clients are subjected to hierarchical controls (Scott 
1972:92; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984:48; Medina and Stokes 2007). Part of the literature 
maintains that clientelism deprives voters of their ability to effectively hold politicians 
accountable (Stokes 2005). This imbalance persists when party supporters are integrated 
in networks (Roniger and Güneş-Ayata 1994; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 8, 17-19). 
Clientelist networks are not regarded as ‘proper groups’, but they are seen as ‘action-sets’ 
of members who are hierarchically connected to party leadership (Scott 1972: 97; Chubb, 
1982:27, 246; Kitschelt, 2000; Wantchekon, 2003). Clients still have heterogeneous and 
mutually antagonistic preferences. When patrons offer club goods, i.e. a benefit that is 
shared by its members (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), the collective provision of goods 
is driven not by the clients’ organizational capacity, but because patrons value their clients 
as voters and campaign resources. Unlike typical interest groups, members of a typical 
client group lack the organizational capacity, autonomy and shared preferences to take 
collective action beyond what their patrons require or allow. When the literature observed 
cases of collective action by client groups, these were exceptional cases in which actions 
were either validated by the patrons themselves (Auyero et al. 2009) or came as protest by 
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small communities that were adequately connected to the outside economy (Shami 2012: 
603). 
 
It is worth exploring, however, how patron-client relationships are redefined when clients 
are organized in labour unions and other civic or professional associations (LaPalompara 
1964; Graziano 1978:297) and how the merger of clientelism with structures of collective 
action affects the bargaining power and the degree of autonomy of the actors involved. 
The nature of relations that develop may go beyond the parameters of conventional 
clientelist exchange. As party clients infiltrate these organizations they gain access to an 
infrastructure for collective organization that retains its formal autonomy. Clients who 
enter labour unions or other professional organizations share an occupational status that 
generates shared interests upon which to organize collective action. As a result, they can 
interact with patrons and the patron party not only in their capacity as individual clients, 
but also collectively through organizations that promote common policy preferences. 
Organized clients obtain a degree of organizational capacity. Unlike atomized clients in 
typical patronage networks, they can establish a regular and formal relationship with 
political power and bargain to secure access to club goods. They can offer coordinated 
support to individual politicians or the party provided they satisfy their collective 
demands.  
 
This hybrid system of interest intermediation also differs from the typical interest-group 
schema in several aspects. Clients who are members of formal organizations are 
personally tied to patronage networks, Unlike typical interest groups, the autonomy of 
unions and other formal associations permeated by clientelist ties is weakened by their 
interpersonal relation to patrons. Personal asymmetry and hierarchy is retained under 
typical patronage controls. Accountability, however, is strengthened by the symbiotic 
relationship between patrons and the party leadership, as they both depend on the electoral 
success of the patron party and its access to power. For patrons clientelism serves as a 
solution to the problems of party organization and cohesion; for clients, electoral success 
secures access to selective benefits, both as individual clients and as members of the 
politically affiliated client group. As a result, the clientelist-collective system shares 
elements from both typical interest-group activity and the typical patron-client framework 
but exhibits idiosyncrasies, as summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Distinct properties of typical clients, organized client groups and non-client 
groups 
 
Typical clients  Organized client groups Typical organized groups  
Source of 
association 
with political 
power 
Clientelist exchange Clientelist exchange and 
occupational and social 
affiliation in  a formal 
organization 
Occupational or other 
affiliation in  a formal 
organization 
Demand from 
political power 
Regular or one-off access to 
resources as ‘private goods’ 
through typical clientelist 
exchange 
Regular access to resources as 
‘private goods’ through typical 
clientelist exchange, and  
access to ‘club goods’ for the 
group through collective 
action 
Regular or one-off access to 
resources as ‘club goods’, 
through collective action, 
which includes public 
advocacy and lobbying, and 
possibly’ explicit or implicit 
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agreement on particular issues 
(one-off or repeated)  
 
Supply to 
political power 
Individual engagement in 
political activism, direct 
involvement in political 
campaign, public 
demonstration of political 
affiliation 
Individual and collective 
political activism, direct 
involvement in political 
campaign, public 
demonstration of political 
affiliation as clients; at times, 
political or policy 
endorsements as collective 
organization 
At times, political or policy 
endorsements depending on 
the type of organization, 
or/and financial support 
Organizational 
capacity  
No, unless requested and 
directed by the patron 
Yes, through typical collective 
action and through party-
affiliated political activism 
Yes, through typical collective 
action  
Preferences Interdependency with patrons Interdependency with the 
patron party as groups of 
clients, which affects the 
formation of the organization's 
preferences  
Independence; may coincide 
or intersect 
Organizational 
autonomy 
No Limited because of members’ 
clientelist ties to the party, 
creating interdependent initial 
preferences 
Yes: occasional formal or 
informal associations with 
political agents may be built, 
preserved or broken on the 
basis of convergent or 
divergent preferences 
Bargaining 
power 
Limited because of collective 
action problems yet clientelist 
networks are valuable to 
patrons 
Considerable thanks to 
organizational capacity and the 
significance of the group as 
political resource for the party 
leadership and patron 
politicians; yet constrained by 
the cost of defection for 
individual clients and by co-
optation tactics by the central 
party targeting clients 
Varies depending on 
organizational capacity, 
lobbying resources (including 
media access and money) and 
scope for shifting alliances 
 
 
The special properties of this clientelist-collective system are not fully captured by the 
typical interest-group framework that assumes that interest groups and the government 
have considerable autonomy from political power in terms of preferences and bargaining 
capacity and that outcomes are largely determined by relative inter-group power (Krueger 
1974; Becker 1983; Alesina and Drazen 1991; Schamis 1999). In the context of 
clientelism, however, the presumption of autonomy underrates overlapping roles within a 
broader party-client nexus: organized clients are both members of the organized group and 
party clients, union leaders are also senior party cadres, while party politicians are both 
policymakers and the patrons of these client groups. This symbiotic relationship over the 
long-term exchange of mutual benefits makes the pattern of collective action in a 
clientelist system more complex in terms of preference formation and the source of 
bargaining power. Benefit-distribution is a process internal to the broader party-client 
network. Patron-client relationships strengthen the value patrons place in the collective 
demands of their clients who are situated at the heart of the network. Patrons are better off 
tackling any policy grievances by these groups with a view to a mutually accommodating 
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settlement in order to avoid losses in party cohesion and support. Clientelist linkages also 
moderate the way labour unions articulate policy preferences and claim collective goals 
from decision-makers who are at the same time their patrons. Patrons can use selective 
patronage benefits to persuade union leaders to adopt a more lenient stance towards their 
policies, especially unionists with aspirations to enter central politics.  
 
The impact of clientelist ties on policy-making and collective action is comparable but not 
identical to the ideological-partisan linkage between trade unions and social democratic 
political parties. Although there are strong incentives for policy alignment in both cases, 
reciprocity in the clientelist-partisan linkage is both personal and group-level, largely 
dependent on the provision of both club goods and private-clientelist goods. The distinct 
microfoundations of reciprocity in the clientelist-partisan linkage have a different impact 
on the nature of policy claims and the source of bargaining strength of the client unions 
and, in the broader context of inter-party competition, skew policy-making differently.  
 
First, both the nature of policy concessions that client groups ask and the nature of 
compensation that government must offer once reforms are under way are different. In 
Sweden, for instance, economic policies since the 1970s distanced the social democrats 
from the trade unions but informal ties were maintained thanks to compensatory 
concessions to private sector workers that involved welfare and retraining policies (Cf. 
Upchurch et al. 2009: 9). In the UK, the clash between the Labour Party and the trade 
unions in the late 1970s primarily regarded wages (Minkin 1992). By contrast, claims in a 
clientelist system where labour unions primarily consist of broader public sector 
employees revolve around the provision of special privileges that distinguish these 
employees from private-sector workers (dual standards). Similarly, compensation needs 
not involve comprehensive welfare and training opportunities for all employees. but it has 
to protect, in sight of restructuring and privatization policies, the privileges broader public 
sector employees enjoy and the turf for individual favouritism. 
 
Second, because clients in the broader state sector are animated by specific clientelist 
privileges both as individuals and organized groups, and not so much by general 
concessions offered to all workers in the private and public sector, they are less keen to 
object to general policies towards fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, provided 
that their privileges are preserved. Labour union militancy is discouraged thanks to patron-
client ties connecting union members, unionists and the party. On the other side, given the 
different nature of concessions at stake, clientelist patrons do not face a fierce dilemma 
between implementing reforms generally restricting welfare and distribution but losing the 
support of unions, on the one hand, or refusing to reform the welfare state to keep the 
unions as allies but risking losing voters, on the other (Kitschelt 2004: 133). The kind of 
dilemma clientelist parties face is about preserving special benefits to core supporters 
under economic hard times, which requires a tailored-made approach to the design of 
reforms.  
 
Third, although in the case of the UK, the unions' demands over wages came to be seen by 
the Labour Party’s leadership as an electoral liability (Mcllroy 2002) while in most social 
democratic settings unions and parties preserved some organizational and sociological ties 
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(Jacoby and Behrens 2014), in the clientelist setting, there are stronger incentives that 
foster political alignment on both interpersonal and group level. Client unions and the 
patron party have stronger interdependencies that make detachment too costly in the 
context of inter-party competition. A government party that withdraws the supply of club 
goods to a client group will risk its ties with that group and could bring upheaval within its 
broader clientelist network. Unionists, on their side, must not neglect to defend the 
clientelist ties connecting union members and the party and should not overlook their role 
as intermediaries in the patronage network. Hierarchy and control over members of the 
broader clientelist network limit the scope for client unionists to express discontent against 
their host political party. 
 
The interpersonal linkages, preference interdependencies and distinct source of bargaining 
power present in the clientelist system have important implications for the type of policies 
the patron party must preferably adopt when in government. We can hypothesize that:  
 
  1)  When economic reforms have to be implemented, the government will be 
better off adjusting its reforms to protect patronage supply to its client groups in order to 
avoid within-party clashes and defections (policy bias in favour of preserving clientelist 
supply); 
 
 2) The above-mentioned concessions (collaboration) and the co-optation of 
unionists inside the broader clientelist network can prevent confrontation between the 
patron party and its affiliated unions during a general programme of economic adjustment. 
 
As the table below illustrates, a patron party in government (G) has the options of either 
ignoring the unions or compromising on its policy to avoid confrontation with the unions. 
The unions inhabited by client groups (U) have the options of confronting the government 
openly or showing complacency. In a clientelist system, for both players, option A 
(ignore, confrontation) leads to mutual losses: a clash will undermine the party’s cohesion 
and mobilization capacity and possibly bring electoral defeat that will jeopardize the 
clients’ access to private and club goods. A patron party in government will be better off 
implementing a policy agenda that would cause the least possible damage to the party’s 
cohesion. For the party, compromise with the unions makes sense as it expects that they 
will reciprocate with a moderate level of protest towards other policies. For the unions, a 
complacent stance towards the government is the preferred option insofar as the 
government is sensitive to their demands as a client group and adjusts its economic policy 
to protect their core interests.  
 
 
Table 2:  Strategic interactions between government and unions in a clientelist 
system 
 Patron party in government 
(G) 
Ignore Compromis
e 
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Confrontation A. Bilateral losses 
U: Loss in policy  
preferences 
and  damage to 
special party ties 
 
 
G: Policy preferences 
attained but damage to its 
ties to the unions with 
implications for party 
cohesion and 
mobilization capacity  
B. Bilateral losses 
U: Gaining policy 
concessions 
but causing 
damage to 
special party ties 
 
 
G: Loss in fully attaining 
policy preferences 
through the prescribed 
policies. Damage to 
party cohesion and 
mobilization capacity  
 
Complacency  C. Bilateral losses 
U:  Loss in policy  
preferences, tension 
among union members 
over complacency 
with government policy 
 
G: Policy preferences 
attained. Maintaining 
social peace, but possible 
losses of clients with 
implications for party 
cohesion and strong 
mobilization capacity  
 
D. Mutual gains 
U: Compromise  
in general policy 
concessions 
but preservation  
of club goods and 
access to individual 
benefits 
G: Loss in fully 
attaining policy 
preferences through the 
prescribed policies. 
Maintaining social 
peace, party cohesion 
and strong mobilization 
capacity  
 
 
 
The clientelist system and its policy implications in Greece 
 
In Greece, patron-client relationships infiltrated labour unions and redefined their 
relationship with political power. Following the fall of the military junta in 1974, centre-
right New Democracy and the socialist PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Party) massively 
appointed party clients in the broader public sector, which included the state monopolies 
in electricity, telecommunications, transport, water and sewage, ports, and radio and 
television as well as many other commercial enterprises in petrol, defence, shipyards and 
cement. By the mid-1980s PASOK had developed the strongest client network among the 
employees of the broader public sector.iii Through its sectoral organizations (kladikes), it 
came to control most labour unions and two main umbrella labour-union associations: the 
Confederation of Civil Servants (ADEDY) that represented public administration 
employees and the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) that represented the 
unions of the private sector and the state-owned sector of the economy (Lyrintzis 1984; 
Spourdalakis 1988; Sotiropoulos, 1996; Lavdas 2005; Lyrintzis, 2005; Matsaganis 2007; 
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Pappas, 2009). Union members in the broader public sector could claim both individual 
favours as clients and collective goods as a group, such as wages higher than the private 
sector, generous pension schemes, early retirement options, extra benefits and holidays. At 
the same time, inside the party’s affiliated labour organizations, ‘free-riding’ behaviour 
and dissent could be easily identified (Sotiropoulos 1996: 61). PASOK’s leader Andreas 
Papandreou kept a tight grip on the party’s labour organizations by frequently expelling 
leaders whose behaviour showed signs of factionalism and autonomy. This tactic sent a 
message to PASOK’s union leaders that their career inside the party network was 
dependent on the endorsement of the party leadership.  
 
This direction of the labour movement can be situated in the broader 'parentela pluralism' 
framework of state-society relations in Greece (Pagoulatos 2003: 161-167) where various 
associations direct their demands to the government party. This structure is highly 
fragmented and therefore, less capable of conducting a broader social dialogue on general 
policies (See 'disjointed corporatism' by Lavdas 2005). However, despite their 
fragmentation, the unions - largely inhabited by broader public sector employees - were 
integrated in centralized party machines (Lyrintzis 1984; Mavrogordatos 1997) and 
formed part of a broader party-clientelist network. Clientelist association with political 
power created a 'unity in fragmentation' under a set of incentives and informal norms 
governing the provision of sector-specific 'club' benefits. This pattern of collective 
organization and interest intermediation created a recurrent policy bias towards the supply 
and preservation of 'club goods' to client groups. The distinct impact on the design of 
economic policy in Greece is noticeable in the period between the mid-1980s and the mid-
2000s, during which macroeconomic imbalances and increasing institutional pressures 
from the European Union pushed consecutive Greek governments to launch economic 
reforms. Among the policy options available, structural reforms in the broader public 
sector and the privatization of state-owned companies were among the key policies 
recommended by international organizations (European Commission 1998: 13; 2000: 31; 
OECD 2001: 9, 12, 31, 84, 114, 116) as part of fiscal stabilization programmes and in 
response to EU law on market liberalization, state aid and competition (Clifton et al. 2003; 
Pagoulatos 2005: 360). These policies, however, threatened to considerably harm the 
status of PASOK’s unionized clients and in the following years tested the relationship 
between party leadership and the labour unions of the broader public sector.  
 
The literature covering PASOK’s reform policies during this period has focused on 
episodes of confrontation between the government and the labour unions which had 
initially divergent preferences over several reform proposals and effectively blocked 
reform efforts (Pagoulatos 2003; Lavdas 2005; Tinios 2005; Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos 
2006; 2011; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008). Here the interaction between unions 
and the government is couched in the typical language of interest groups versus the 
government. However, if labour unions acted as ‘veto-players’ that blocked deep-cutting 
structural reforms, the source of the unions' remarkably strong bargaining power remains 
theoretically under-explored. It is still puzzling how these groups could hinder policy 
initiatives given the electoral success and parliamentary majority of the self-proclaimed 
‘modernizing’ government of Prime Minister Simitis (1995-2004). At the same time, 
Greece came under strong pressures to implement economic reforms, most prominently, 
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binding EU Directives, mechanisms of policy surveillance, and the urgent need to fix its 
finances to avoid exclusion from the Eurozone and a loss of creditworthiness. Entry to the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) was an important benchmark for the Simitis 
government but the Maastricht criteria and the Stability Pact allowed it some scope to 
choose a policy mix. Hence, focusing on confrontation episodes does not disclose broader 
information about how the party-union linkage relationship shaped PASOK’s overall mix 
of economic policy and pre-empted further clashes throughout the period in which 
PASOK was under consistent pressure to reform the Greek economy (1985-80 and 1993-
2004).  
 
The overview of economic policy under PASOK and of party-union relations inside 
PASOK's broader support network offers a better insight into the workings of the 
clientelist system and its impact on policy-making. We can distinguish variations with 
regard how its ties with the unions influenced PASOK's policies: open confrontation, 
coordination with co-optation and contained confrontation. In each pattern we observe 
different implications for the relationship between PASOK and its affiliated unions. Open 
confrontation between the party and leading party unionists led to mutual losses when in 
1985 the re-elected PASOK government responded to a balance of payment crisis with a 
wage freeze and austerity measures, causing a rift inside the labour union movement. 
PASOK ultimately abandoned its programme earlier than announced and sought to restore 
its ties with the labour unions in the run-up to the 1989 election. Returning to power in 
1993 PASOK excluded full privatization from its stabilization programme and abstained 
from implementing comprehensive structural reforms that could harm the status of the 
unionized employees of the broader public sector (collaboration with co-optation). Policy 
adaptation by PASOK did not prevent occasional outbursts of dissent over specific policy 
reforms from party unionists but the scale of their reactions was constrained to avoid 
undermining PASOK’s cohesion (contained confrontation).  
 
 
Open confrontation (1985-1987) 
 
Chronic problems of the Greek economy led to a current account crisis in 1985 soon after 
the general election. The re-elected PASOK government announced a stabilization 
programme with a general wage freeze, rising taxes and the temporary abolition of 
collective wage bargaining together with currency devaluation, which affected all salaried 
workers in the private and the public sector. The programme, however, excluded 
privatization, market deregulation, the closure of ailing state-owned companies and 
reductions in the size of state sector employment (OECD 1987: 20; OECD 1992: 182-3), 
which would have hit public sector employees. These groups were spared from permanent 
losses in their status but, just as workers in the private sector, had income losses due to the 
wage freeze under a double digit inflation. The sudden announcement of austerity came as 
a shock to the labour unions whose members and leaders expected PASOK to meet its pre-
electoral pledge for a generous wage policy. A section of PASOK’s loyal unionists reacted 
to PASOK’s stabilization, defected from the party organization and aligned with 
Communist Party unionists in an attempt to take control of the GSEE. The government 
appointed compliant unionists in their place. However, tensions inside the PASOK support 
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basis and growing public dissatisfaction with austerity led Prime Minister Andreas 
Papandreou to end the stabilization programme earlier than scheduled. PASOK relaxed its 
fiscal policy and resumed patronage appointments before the 1989 election.iv PASOK 
wanted to restore and strengthen its alliance with these groups in view of the coming 
general election. PASOK’s unionists realigned with the party to preserve their access to 
both individual privileges and ‘club goods’. Despite the policy U-turn, the confrontation 
between PASOK and its unionists led to mutual losses and contributed to PASOK’s 
electoral defeat and the election of a government much less attached to the unions. This 
clash offered a useful lesson for ensuing PASOK governments about the politically 
optimal design of economic policy from the perspective of a patron party and suggested 
that collaboration is the optimal strategy in designing economic reform (As in table 2 
above).  
 
Coordination with co-optation (1993-2000) 
 
Despite its pre-electoral commitments to abandon fiscal austerity, PASOK returning to 
power in 1993 pursued fiscal consolidation with a combination of higher taxes and tight 
monetary policy. It also halted the privatization programme which the previous 
government had announced. In 1995, the newly elected Prime Minister Costas Simitis 
proclaimed the desire to secure Greece's entry to the EMU by 1999. His policy heavily 
relied on direct taxes and launched gradual and relatively mild structural reforms in the 
labour market and the pension system. The economic policy spread the fiscal cost of 
economic adjustment across the population while it protected the employment status of the 
unionized employees of the broader public sector (Table 3). This economic policy caused, 
for the most part, mild reactions from the politically-affiliated labour unions. However, the 
prospect of privatization, particularly of the utility companies in telecommunications, 
electricity and water supply, became a constant source of concern for public sector 
employees and their unions. To prevent serious reactions, the government reassured that 
only minority shares would be sold through flotation while the management of the public 
utilities companies would stay in the hands of the state. These enterprises were also 
protected from competition through informal barriers that essentially prevented the entry 
of competitors in the same markets (OECD 2001:16, 30 and 95). The employees of these 
corporations secured permanent tenure and generous retirement benefits and pension 
plans. In addition, the government offered part of the privatization proceeds to the staff’s 
social security funds (Börsch-Supan and Tinios 2001: 404-5). Older employees were also 
offered the option of early retirement. For the remaining employees, average wages in 
public enterprises grew faster than wages in the private sector. However, newly appointed 
employees were hired under different employment terms, often as temporary contract 
workers or trainees, which allowed the management some flexibility. This ‘dualism’ in 
employment terms between a highly protected old guard of employees and new employees 
with largely fragmented employment terms was a clear indication of the way the 
government sought to modernize public sector enterprises without undermining the ties 
with its unionized clients.  
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Table 3: Pattern of economic adjustment in Greece during the PASOK years (1993-
2004) 
Horizontal diffusion of adjustment costs Favouritism towards client groups 
 Rising taxation (both direct and 
indirect) 
 Currency devaluation (in 1998)  
 Tight monetary policy (1993-1998) 
affecting export industries  
 Limited reform of public enterprises 
and organizations 
 High tax burden of employment and 
high national security contributions 
 Failure to cut subsidies to ailing public 
sector enterprises (Olympic Airways, state 
television, railways) 
 Wage restraint in the private sector 
(1997-2000) 
 Increase in the tariffs and fees of public 
utility companies 
 Increased public borrowing nominally 
and as percentage of GDP 
 Assumption by the government of the 
debt of state-owned banks, agricultural 
cooperatives and public corporations (mainly 
through state guarantees  
 Subsidies to pension funds 
 Subsidies to deficit-running public 
enterprises and their pension funds 
 Failure to modernize or privatize 
deficit-running enterprises 
 Indirect protectionism of the 
monopoly status of government-controlled 
corporations (in violation of EC law 
Privileged terms of employment (wage 
benefits, early retirement, retirement 
bonus for public sector employees 
 Generous retirement schemes in 
modernization plans for several state-
owned enterprises  
 Extra  fiscal benefits to public sector 
employees in the form of overtime 
payment, compensation for extracurricular 
activities, such as participation in various 
committees and travelling expenses 
 
 
 
Party unionists declared their opposition to any reform plans that could negatively affect 
the status of their members, such as the full-scale privatization of state-owned companies. 
At the same time, they valued the ties they had cultivated inside the party network and 
refrained from reacting strongly against the stabilization programme. Both party unionists 
and party politicians shared an interest in PASOK’s electoral success. Confrontation was 
kept at bay to avoid further escalation that could hurt the party unity and undermine 
PASOK’s chances for re-election. Overall, informal clientelist ties connecting ministers, 
managers and unionists in the broader public sector limited the scope of reforms in the 
broader public sector (Spanou 2008: 161).  
 
These party-union linkages also helped tone down the scale and nature of reactions over 
specific policy measures. Engagement with PASOK gave client employees the 
opportunity to enjoy extra benefits and good work placements in the broader public sector 
and offered unionists the prospect of a career in central politics.v This pattern of policy co-
ordination and co-optation was manifested in the small scale of the rallies and protests 
organized by the unions despite the prolonged austerity programme (Vima, 3 November 
1996; Kathimerini, 1 July 2001). A Social Pact was signed in 1997 which committed 
unions to wage moderation and social dialogue in return for important concessions in 
employment law. The unions’ mild response to government policies was unprecedented 
given the prior history of labour activism in Greece.vi However, the relationship between 
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the government and its affiliated unionists remained delicate and depended on mutual 
interest accommodation. In this context, party unionists had to keep a delicate balance 
between acting as labour representatives and conforming to the role of party cadres who 
were expected to support government policy. A statement by PASOK’s union leader 
epitomizes this relationship:  
 
‘I have never hidden the fact that I belong to PASOK. Nor am I hiding the fact that 
I have supported, I do support and will continue to support President Simitis. Of 
course, this does not mean that I will not react if the government attempts to hurt 
our acquired rights’ (Vima newspaper, 5 April 1998, emphasis added). 
 
Contained confrontation (2001-2002) 
 
Despite efforts for policy co-ordination and co-optation, the PASOK government did not 
avoid confrontation with the labour unions over specific policy initiatives. The full sale of 
a middle-sized bank, Ioniki, in 1998 tested the relationship between PASOK and its 
affiliated unions. Although the government reassured the employees that the new terms of 
employment would prevent future lay-offs,vii PASOK-affiliated unionists outside this bank 
saw the privatization as a breach of PASOK’s policy commitments.viii At the same time, 
criticism inside the Cabinet targeted the way the Ministry of the Economy handled the 
union’s reactions.ix As a way out, the government presented the full sale of Ioniki as an 
isolated case and rejected proposals for broader structural reforms and full privatizations 
in an effort to appease the unions and prevent general unrest (Nea, 16 March 1998). 
 
A second and most serious round of labour unrest broke up in 2002 in reaction to 
proposals to reform the pension system that would have changed several of the terms of 
retirement for public and private sector employees. The leaders of GSEE and ADEDY, 
who were also senior PASOK members, rebelled against the reform plan with a scale of 
public protests that clearly demonstrated that these unions had retained a solid 
mobilization capacity. The protests forced the government to pass a moderate reform of 
the pension system (Matsaganis 2002). Several PASOK’s unionists sought to reinstate 
their role as intermediaries between their members and the party and became overtly 
critical of the government’s economic policy.x In response, Prime Minister Simitis 
cancelled a number of scheduled reforms and called an early party conference in an 
attempt to reconcile with the unions and elicit a vote of confidence from numerous party 
factions. In the run-up to the conference, a generous ‘social package’ of welfare policies 
and wage increases in the public sector were announced. At the conference, party 
unionists expressed concerns about the direction of government policy but did not 
challenge Simitis as the party leader. Party unity was the recurrent slogan of the 
conference, echoing the shared desire of the party base and the affiliated unionists to keep 
PASOK in power.xi Prime Minister Simitis comfortably won the conference ballot and 
received public reassurances from the party’s leading unionists in support of PASOK’s 
cohesion. These episodes were useful in reconfirming that compromise between the 
government and the unions was the optimal strategic choice for both sides, congruent with 
the lessons of the 1985-87 confrontation (As table 2 shows).  
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The three patterns of government-unions interactions (Table 4) reveal the idiosyncrasies of 
policy-making and collective action in Greece's clientelist system in view of mutual 
commitments and shared interests by political patrons and their client groups. PASOK's 
macroeconomic stabilization did not shy away from unpopular measures such as 
increasing taxation,xii  but it made limited progress with structural reforms that could have 
curbed government spending and could have reduced the need to raise new revenue. The 
cost of macroeconomic stabilization was horizontally diffused across the population while 
noticeable adjustments in structural reforms protected the core interests of PASOK’s client 
groups in the broader public sector. This reform pattern substantiates policy bias in favour 
or preserving the supply of club goods to client groups, in view of interdependent 
preferences between PASOK and its affiliated unions: they were both better off following 
a strategy of policy collaboration in the design of policies and, in the cases of an initial 
divergence of preferences, co-optation and mutual compromise. 'Clientelist bias' may also 
be observed in New Democracy's reform record before the 2009 crisis, this time 
concerning the protection from liberalization policies of its main body of supporters in 
professional associations, even though the Greek centre-right party had less attachments to 
public sector unions (Trantidis 2014) and proceeded with the full privatization of the state 
telecommunications enterprise (OTE) and several banks when it returned to power (2004-
2009). Finally, the shrinking of distributional politics during the crisis period may be seen 
as a key reason behind's PASOK's electoral collapse and New Democracy's relative 
decline.   
 
 
Table 4: Interaction between client groups and the patron party 
 
Open confrontation Coordination with co-
optation 
Contained 
confrontation 
Policy  Austerity measures and 
incomes policy by the 
party in government 
(1985-1987)  
Austerity measures, 
fiscal policy and partial 
privatization by the 
party in government 
(1993-2004) 
Full privatization and 
pensions reform by the 
party in government 
(1998, 2001) 
Client-group response Internal splits and 
confrontation with the 
party in government 
followed by defections 
of top-level unionists 
 
Implicit collaboration 
and co-optation of 
unionists by the party,   
Clash with the party in 
government  but with 
no defections, leading 
to policy compromise 
Party stance toward its 
client groups 
Initially intransigent, 
with the expulsion of 
dissenters coupled with 
co-optation of 
complacent union 
leaders  
Sensitive to group 
claims and eager to 
adjust its policy; co-
optation through career 
promotions 
Initially intransigent but 
later willing to 
negotiate and 
compromise 
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Outcome Mutual losses and 
abandonment of the 
programme later 
(November 1987) 
Mutual gains 
Partial reforms, fiscal 
stabilization and mostly 
partial privatizations in 
which the management 
remained under state 
control with  old 
employment privileges 
safeguarded  
Risk of mutual losses 
prevented 
 
Compromise on a 
watered-down reform 
package followed by 
‘social package’ 
concessions to the 
unions 
Impact on the client-
group 
Splits in the union: 
political isolation of 
defectors  
Preservation of ties 
with the party 
Reassertion of relative 
autonomy against the 
central party  
Impact on the party Tensions within the 
party, overcome by the 
abandonment of 
austerity 
Smooth implementation 
of the government’s 
economic programme 
Tensions within the 
party, overcome by the 
abandonment of the 
initial plan and the 
adoption of a 
compromised package 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Policy-making and patterns of collective action are shaped by the institutional setting in 
which they are embedded. Party clients can become members of organizations endowed 
with resources and institutional autonomy, such as labour unions, and can take collective 
action to safeguard both the benefits they enjoy by virtue of their membership in the 
unions and the turf for patronage as individual clients. Compared to the typical framework 
of government and interest groups, this hybrid system of interest intermediation has 
distinct properties. Rent-seeking is internal to a broader party-client network and develops 
on the basis of recurrent reciprocity there. The context of interactions and negotiations is 
configured by close ties between client groups and the party. Organized clients have 
overlapping identities: through the unions, they can demand accountability from the 
patron over the provision of club goods, but they remain accountable as individual clients 
for their political behaviour. This strengthens their position as clients compared to the 
typical patron-client relationship but limits the autonomy of the labour unions they 
inhabit; how far they can go in contesting policy proposals, especially those that do not 
directly threaten their status as client groups. Clientelist ties favour moderation, mutual 
accommodation and policy compromise as the optimal strategies for both patron parties 
and the organized client groups. As a result, the source of resistance to policy-making is 
found in the key position of client groups at the heart the party system as vital campaign 
resources for individual patrons and the party as a whole.  
 
In addition, the symbiotic relationship between patrons and organized clients has 
noticeable implications for policy-making. The government party's autonomy from client 
groups and its scope to shift social alliances or forge new ones to promote new policies is 
considerably more limited in a clientelist system than in the typical interest-group 
framework. A patron party in government values its client groups not merely as voters but 
also as active members of its broader support network. It must adjust its policies to 
safeguard their privileges or risk undermining its cohesion and mobilization capacity and 
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triggering defections that could strengthen its political rivals. These considerations 
introduce a 'clientelist bias' in the design of economic reforms, which is likely to be 
resilient even under pressing economic conditions and strong international commitments. 
Yet, unlike social democratic unionism, the nature of concessions to client groups is 
highly particularistic and fragmented. This means that clientelist bias can include 
economic policies that diffuse the cost of adjustment across the general population. 
 
Observation of settings outside Greece, despite local differences, may also point to 
comparable patterns of co-optation and confrontation between clientelist parties and 
affiliated unions in view of necessitated reforms under an economic crisis, and their 
political consequences  (in Latin America and the Caribbean, see George 2003: 9-10, 21-
22; Taylor 2004:220). In Latin America, following a strategy of co-optation of labour 
unions by clientelist parties during a period of protectionist policies, reformist 
governments faced the dilemma of how to promote deep-cutting structural reforms and 
address the economic crisis. Governments resorted to ‘populist’ strategies and traditional 
patron-client relationships in an effort to disentangle from clientelist-corporatist linkages. 
When Carlos Menem’s radical ‘all or nothing’ reform programme caused a clash with the 
unions in Argentina, Menem opted for the substitution of labour-union linkages for direct 
patronage supply to the urban poor and rural constituencies but, despite his second 
electoral success, this strategy did not prevent his defeat by the left-wing section of his 
own party during his second term (Ronchi 2007: 13, 16). However, the experience of 
Argentina also points to the weakened capacity of the hitherto co-opted unions to swiftly 
and successfully thwart deep-cutting reforms at the onset (Ronchi 2007: 30). The Mexican 
and the Argentinean cases suggest that populism, charismatic leadership and vertical 
patronage ties with individual voters (Teichman 1996: 138-145; Ronchi 2007: 6, 23-26, 
28) can prolong the political sustainability of policies that hurt organized client groups but 
cannot prevent, in the longer term, the demise of the parties that pursue them.  
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